Divine Epiphany and Pious Discourse in Plato's Phaedrus
Andrea Nightingale
Arion, 2018
This essay analyzes Plato's use of (1) poetic texts that feature divine epiphanies, and (2) the language of the Eleusinian mysteries, which featured a divine epiphany. Plato uses traditional notions of divine epiphany (a god appearing to a human) to portray the Forms as divine Beings that appear to the philosopher in a new kind of epiphany
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Initiation, ritual, and experience in the Eleusinian Mysteries and on Plato's Symposium: a preliminary analysis
Andre da Paz
Unpublished (Seminário Archai 2022), 2022
ABSTRACT: On this paper we formulate a few preliminary questions on initiation in both the Eleusinian Mysteries and on Plato's Symposium, with the idea of transposition as the groundwork for our work, in an attempt to identify a few elements of the Eleusinian Mysteries supposedly transposed in the dialogue between the 'young' Socrates and Diotima. Thus, our paper is divided in two central parts: the first one, the longest one, in which we analyze what initiation could have been in the Eleusinian Mysteries, having as our goal a better understanding of the Eleusinian initiation and what transposition this initiation might carry on to the case of the 'young Socrates'; the second one, the short one, we'll focus on Plato's Symposium, trying to identify signs and hints of elements from the Eleusinian Mysteries, centrally focused on the transposition of 'vision', with the goal of formulating our hypothesis that there are transpositions made by Plato from the Eleusinian Mysteries. In other words, here on this paper we will focus mainly on the element of vision and, hopefully, expand this scope of view to envelop all of the transpositions supposedly made by Plato from the Eleusinian Mysteries during the dialogue between young Socrates and Diotima on our PhD thesis.
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Eidos and Dynamis. The Intertwinement of Being and Logos in Plato’s Thought
Lorenzo Giovannetti
2022
Series Dynamis. Il pensiero antico e la sua tradizione: studi e testi Editorial Board Francesco Aronadio, Bruno Centrone, Franco Ferrari, Francesco Fronterotta, Fiorinda Li Vigni Scientific Board Rachel Barney, Cristina D’Ancona, Christoph Helmig, Irmgard Männlein-Robert, Pierre-Marie Morel, Lidia Palumbo, Gretchen Reydams- Schils, Barbara Sattler, Mauro Serra, Amneris Roselli, Mauro Tulli, Gherardo Ugolini This volume presents a new reading of how ontology and language intertwine in Plato’s thought. The main idea is that the structure of reality determines how language works. Conversely, analysing Plato’s view on language is key to understanding his ontology. This work first focuses on Plato’s standard theory of Forms and the plurality of functions they perform with regard to thought, knowledge and language. The volume then provides a detailed interpretation of the first definition of episteme as perception in Plato’s Theaetetus, which is ultimately said to make language impossible. The main argument is that basic linguistic acts such as reference and predication rely on fundamental ontological grounds. Finally, the critique of the Theaetetus is connected to the complex account of true and false logoi in the Sophist. The result is a new interpretation of how language is connected to the ontology of kinds put forward in the Sophist, with particular regard to the nature of the kind Being. This book provides a detailed exegetical investigation into a crucial aspect of Plato’s thought, which can also be of interest to those working in metaphysics and philosophy of language. The publication is Open Access thanks to the generous support of the IISF: https://www.iisf.it/index.php/pubblicazioni-iisf/edizioni-iisf-press/eidos-and-dynamis-the-intertwinement-of-being-and-logos-in-plato-s-thought.html
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«Paradigmatic Method and Platonic Epistemology», in SECOND SAILING: Alternative Perspectives on Plato Edited by Debra Nails and Harold Tarrant (Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum 132) Helsinki, 2015, p.1-20
Dimitri El Murr
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Visions of the Suprarational: A Study of the Concept of Spiritual Sight in the Works of Plato and St. Augustine of Hippo (master's thesis; new version w. minor corrections and some additions)
Edmund Schilvold
The Platonic Revivial, 2024
My master's thesis, which one could say is the culmination of more than ten years of research into the nature of Platonism and Christianity, mysticism and religion, as well as of a very long personal, spiritual journey, is now available for download as an e-book/PDF-file. This is the longest and most significant literary work I have published since the completion of my first collection of poems, On the Mystical Road of Longing (my second book), back in 2008. I have called it A Study of the Concept of Nous, since this is an academic paper, and since the nature of Nous or "Intellect" (as it is often translated) is its primary focus, but it could also have been styled The Platonic Heritage of Traditional Christianity, or Why Christians Should Acknowledge That They Are Platonists, or Why We Need To Recover A Direct Connection To The Divine. For in this study, I describe some rather startling discoveries, such as the existence of a Platonic theology resembling the theology hinted at by Christ himself, in his sayings in the Gospels, and later expressed in the Nicene Creed. When one calls to mind that Plato lived some 400 years before the emergence of Christianity, and some 700 years before the council was convened at Nicea, this cannot but be viewed as staggering. Another discovery I elaborate on is the distinction which may be made, on the basis of Plato's own words, between the Good (Itself) and the Idea of the Good (or the "Form" of the Good, as it is sometimes called), and that this distinction could be seen as referring to the same metaphysical realities (or divine entities) as those Christianity calls Father and Son, or Father and Eternal Word. In fact, Plato himself uses the metaphors of Father and Child (or Offspring), and it seems highly probable that St. Augustine of Hippo was aware of this when he spoke of the Idea or Face of God, as I show the chapter on St. Augustine. This distinction is closely related to yet another realization I have arrived at, namely that the two different "roads" to or "modes of apprehending" the Supreme God, the "Via Positiva" and "Via Negativa", usually seen as originating with late Platonism (so-called "Neoplatonism") or early medieval Christianity (St. Denis or "Pseudo-Dionysius") are in fact present in the works of Plato himself. I also touch on the multiple levels of meaning built into the Republic (Norwegian: Staten), which is arguably Plato's most important dialogue, and why this means that the Republic, the main title of which in Greek is Politeia, should actually be called Government, since this term preserves the several levels of meaning alluded to by the original one. But the most important part of my thesis has to do with Nous (or Noos), and is about the recovery, in both a linguistic, educational and psychological sense, of a complete anthropology, as one might call it, meaning a view of the human being (the individual Soul) which takes into account and aims to reawaken the ability to connect with the Above, i.e. with the metaphysical realities beyond this world of nature and of matter, and, ultimately, with the Supreme Deity, the source of Wisdom and Objective Knowledge. I find it difficult to believe that I am almost alone, at least in the present day and age, in having seen the astonishing aspects of Platonism (and the momentous implications) I have here mentioned or alluded to, but it does indeed look that way to me at present. One possible way to interpret the near absence of academic works dealing with these subjects is avoidance, meaning that a number of people have found what I have found, but that almost all of them have chosen not to commit their discoveries to writing. Another possibility is that the vast majority of readers of Plato and St. Augustine are so mentally dominated by the zeitgeist (which is that of Materialism and Reductionism, Nominalism and Anti-Essentialism), and by certain schools of interpretation, that they are quite incapable of seeing what the ancient texts actually state and imply. Both are probably contributing to the strange status quo. I should mention, however, that I am greatly indebted to a modern-day Platonist who, back in the 1990s, gave and published a long series of lectures on Platonic philosophy, namely Dr. Pierre Grimes – as I have stated in the introduction to my thesis. That long series of absolutely fantastic lectures contributed significantly to the first kindling in me of an interest in the Platonic worldview, back in 2009 and 2010. I did not fully understand everything that was said, but many of the surprising messages and the fascinating perspectives remained with me, and when I began the systematic research for my master's thesis, in September 2019, I was able to draw on and take advantage of what I had learned around a decade earlier. Well, without further ado, as they say, I present to you my thesis, and invite you to download it and read it, free of charge. Please see link below. P.S.: I welcome polite and Truth-oriented discussion, so if you have questions or comments you believe to be well-founded, or you are a researcher with a similar or different perspective, I would love to hear from you. This paper may also be viewed on and downloaded from my homepage at https://edmund-schilvold.com/ This is a new version of the master's thesis published here on Academia in late 2020. You can still find the old version elsewhere on my profile.
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Georgia Petridou, Divine Epiphany in Greek Literature and Culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. 427. Cloth (ISBN 978-0-19-872392-9) $160.00
Lisa Maurizio
New England classical journal, 2017
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The Journey of Philosophy: The Significance of the Concluding Myth in Plato’s Republic
James Risser
Plato’s Republic is regarded as a classic text in the history of philosophy not only for its vision of the nature of philosophy, but also for the way in which it relates philosophy to the issues of education and the character of political life. For many readers of Plato the interconnection of these issues reach a high point in the middle books of the Republic, suggesting that it is here that we find Plato’s position concerning each. Accordingly, the concluding book of the Republic is often read with a view to the position taken in the middle books. The analysis of imitation (mimesis) practiced by the painter and the poet in Book Ten is to confirm their unsuitability for participation in the ideal city and for the task of the proper education of the soul. Without much attention, the concluding Myth of Er is considered an afterthought as an account of the destiny of the soul at a cosmic level. There is, however, a growing body of literature that infers for a number of reasons that the constructed polis of the philosopher-king is unliveable and, as a utopian vision, has much that is lacking. The result of this is to suggest that what Plato is actually arguing for in the Republic is more complex and subtle, and that the middle books of the Republic need to be read in the context of the entirety of the Republic from beginning to end. My purpose in this paper is not to directly take up this issue of the intended argument of the Republic, but to consider it indirectly by focusing on an interpretation of the concluding Myth of Er. It is my contention that the Myth of Er has a remarkable connection with the very beginning of the Republic, and, when taken together, one can re-read the middle books of the Republic, especially the Allegory of the Cave, in a new light. The Myth of Er is introduced in Book Ten after a brief discussion of the rewards and punishments of justice and injustice, reminding the reader of the question initially posed in Book One of the Republic, namely, that concerning justice in the soul, which has everything to do with the practice of philosophy. It is of course a practice that is inseparable from political life, as we know not only from the Republic, but from the Apology and Plato’s Seventh Letter. The actual myth is a simply a report by Er, who had come back from the dead, of what he had seen in his journey in the afterworld. The content of the report describes the drama of the comings and goings of the souls of humans with respect to a just life. At the center of this drama there is an elaborate account of the soul’s vision of cosmic Necessity from which the just life–the proper order of the living–is to be understood, for after beholding the spectacle each soul is called upon to choose a new life for itself. At this point in the story Socrates reminds Glaucon of the importance of being able to learn to distinguish the good and the bad life so as to be able to choose with care the better from among those that are possible. After each soul chooses a life, the souls are led to the barren plain of forgetfulness (Lethē) and camp by the river of neglect and carelessness (Ameleta), whose water no vessel can contain. Here all the souls had to drink a certain measure (metron), and those not saved by thoughtfulness (phronesis) drank more than the measure. And what then are we to learn from the Myth of Er? The myth appears to underscore the basic character of the practice of philosophy as a theoretical activity that does not stand by itself, but is taken up in relation to a practical demand. That is to say, the enactment of philosophy is dramatically joined to accomplishment in life, to living well for which one cannot be without care. Such accomplishment is inseparable from a constant measure-taking as well as a recovery from forgetting. Plato’s description here is at odds with a philosopher-king of the middle books of the Republic who presumably knows and lives the just life, but it is not at all at odds with the philosopher in the Allegory of the Cave, who returns to the cave and constantly lives with the shadows. Moreover, the Myth of Er also serves to underscore a very distinctive, certainly a pre-modern, notion of the theoretical, one that is tied to the motifs of journeying and reporting. In classical Greece, the cultural practice of theoria involved a journey abroad, i.e., to a journey outside the city, for the sake of witnessing an event or spectacle. This practice consisted essentially of pilgrimages to religious festivals and journeys abroad for the sake of learning. As a civic activity, the theoros was often an official witness to a spectacle, and was required upon his return home to give a verbal account of what he had seen. This activity not only characterizes that of Er who brings back a report in his return from a religious festival in the afterlife, but also Socrates who at the beginning of the Republic makes a journey outside the city to a festival. In this context it would appear that Plato wants to turn the traditional theoria into a philosophic theoria, which we can see portrayed in the Allegory of the Cave where Plato provides an account of the way to and from the seeing of being in the spectacle of truth. A careful reading of the end of the Republic demands not only that the reader must treat the text in its entirely, but also that it should raise questions that might in the end temper the character of Plato’s idealism.
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PHIL 681 - Pelton - long 1 - Exploring the Daimonion-Elenchus as Dialectic Examination in Plato’s Republic
Dylan Pelton
PHIL 681 - Pelton - long 1 - Exploring the Daimonion-Elenchus as Dialectic Examination in Plato’s Republic, 2017
Paper for a graduate seminar on Plato. PHIL 681: Ancient Philosophical Figures: Selected Dialogues of Plato. Spring 2017. Professor Rose Cherubin. Course information: https://philosophy.gmu.edu/courses/phil681/course_sections/30715 Course syllabus: https://d101vc9winf8ln.cloudfront.net/syllabuses/30715/original/681s17s.pdf?1485443544 ABSTRACT: In Blindness and Orientation, Reeve examines the role of Socrates’ daimonion with respect to its significance throughout Socratic dialectic. He characterizes this daimonion as Socrates’ “own peculiar gift,” one which “represented the special care of Apollo for him.” In this connection, Reeve notes the significance of the Socratic use of the verb elegchein, “the root of our noun elenchus,” which, as a kind of refutation, is integrally connected to Socratic examination. It is through such an examination, by way of the elenchus, that the daimonion Apollo, as “the rational element in our souls,” “becomes the daimon in all of us.” And Socratic dialectic, as “a descendent of the Socratic elenchus” (BR xi), catalyzes, sustains, and maintains this fundamental process. Additionally, Reeve observes that “[i]nsofar as human beings are ruled by their rational part, insofar as they are rational, they pursue whatever they pursue for the sake of eudaimonia”; and, “[s]ince this consists in having good things be theirs throughout their lives,” an inseparable connection is established between the good and that rational element of our souls, exemplified and catalyzed by the daimonion-elenchus vis a vis examination. The purpose of this paper, in turn, will be to modestly explore some of these connections in more detail, touching on relevant details, such as some distinctions between craft-knowledge and divine knowledge, how these pertain to human wisdom and the virtues, where those fit into the daimonion-elenchus process, and what these have to do with the good and eudaimonia with respect to establishing a grounds for the philosophically examined life as the best life for humans. This will be done primarily with reference to Plato’s Republic. To make this more explicit, I will attempt to show that, insofar as eudaimonia pertains to the good, and, insofar as “the form of the good is itself loved in the way such a thing can be loved; by being known or contemplated,” there is a more fundamental relation that can be established between Socrates’ daimonion (with respect to the Socratic elenchus as dialectic) and “[k]nowing the good … [as] the pinnacle of happiness [i.e., eudaimonia], and the philosophical life, which is centered on it … [as] the best human one” (BR xii).
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On Wondering and Wandering: Theoria in Greek Philosophy and Culture
Andrea Nightingale
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\u3ci\u3eThis Strange Creature\u3c/i\u3e: Plato and Conversion Experiences
Joseph Cimakasky
2021
In Plato’s corpus, the Greek word ἐξαίφνης appears precisely thirty-six times. Translated generally as “all of a sudden” or “the instant” in his Parmenides, ἐξαίφνης emerges in some of the most significant passages of Plato’s dialogues. Put simply, ἐξαίφνης connotes illumination of the highest realities and philosophical conversion experience. In addition to providing a review of Plato’s conception and use of ἐξαίφνης in Parmenides, Republic, Symposium, and the Seventh Letter, our paper brings an ancillary link to light. Namely, the appearance of ἐξαίφνης as a mark for conversion experiences in the New Testament’s Acts of the Apostles and Plotinus’s Enneads. We reveal how the same pattern and employment of ἐξαίφνης established by Plato emerge in both Acts and the Enneads. This pattern suggests a prolonged period of thinking and training, followed by a flash of understanding. Thus ἐξαίφνης, as evidenced by our survey of its strange instantiation in Plato’s dialogues and then su...
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